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e Measure of Knowledge1
Nick Treanor
University of Cambridge
We know a lot…. We have all sorts of everyday knowledge, and we have it 
in abundance. To doubt that would be absurd. 
            – David Lewis, “Elusive Knowledge”
It is a rather curious fact in philosophy that the data which are undeniable 
to start with are always rather vague and ambiguous. You can, for in-
stance, say: ‘there are a number of people in this room at this moment.’ 
at is obviously in some sense undeniable. But when you come to try 
and de!ne what this room is, and what it is for a person to be in a room, 
and how you are going to distinguish one person from another, and so 
forth, you !nd that what you have said is most fearfully vague and that 
you really do not know what you meant. at is a rather singular fact, 
that everything you are really sure of right oﬀ is something that you do 
not know the meaning of [...].
              – Bertrand Russell, e Philosophy of Logical Atomism
I know more now than I did when I was 10 years old. is claim is, to use Russell’s expression, 
“obviously in some sense undeniable”. Or at least, if we set aside skeptical worries and grant that I 
had some knowledge when I was 10 years old and that I have some knowledge now, then it seems 
obviously true and unremarkable to say that I have more knowledge now than I did then.
e same is true, surely, of you: You know more now than you did when you were 10 
years old.
1 Versions of this work have been presented at the Freie Universität Amsterdam, the 2009 Bellingham 
Summer Philosophy Conference, the University of Geneva, a meeting of the UK Mind Network, and at the 
Serious Metaphysics Group, and a faculty colloquium, at Cambridge. I have bene!ted on each occasion 
from the discussion and thank in particular Don Fallis and Joshue Orozco, who commented at Bellingham, 
and Frank Jackson, who commented at the faculty colloquium. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee 
for this journal, to Duncan Pritchard and the University of Edinburgh for hosting me as a visitor while I 
worked on this paper, and to the Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities at 
Cambridge for an early career fellowship that provided me leave to !nish it.
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Moreover, it is not merely that these claims seem obviously true, it is that we are deeply 
committed to the possibility of their being true – to it being at least in principle possible for one 
person to know more than another, or for a person to know more at one time than she does at 
another. Regardless of whether you or I know more than we did when we were 10 years old, there 
is at least something it would be for this claim to be true.
But what would that be?  What I want to press in this paper is that the claim that one 
person knows more than another is, to quote Russell again, something that we “do not know the 
meaning of”. So too for the claim that we have knowledge “in abundance”. at there is 
something philosophers do not understand is hardly surprising. But knowledge, and the having of 
more of it, is so central to philosophy that the ignorance is especially troubling here. Moreover, 
the issue of what it is to know more connects to central questions in the philosophy of mind, 
reveals and probably reduces to important metaphysical issues, and can reform our understanding 
of epistemic normativity.
To get to this, let me !rst both broaden and narrow the scope of the question. e 
truisms mentioned above involve simply the idea of knowing more, or of knowing a certain 
amount, without any domain restriction. I know more now than I did when I was 10 years old, 
and you, I, David Lewis and everyone else all have knowledge in abundance. But we also think it 
is obviously true that it is possible to know more or less, and to know a lot, about some domain 
or subject matter, and we are again deeply committed to this being the case. For instance, I know 
more about New York than I did 10 years ago. I know more about the metaphysics of mind than 
I do about the problem of free will. Jaegwon Kim knows more about the metaphysics of mind 
than I do. Here, as in the unrestricted example, we have something like the idea that the 
knowledge we have comes in amounts such that a person has, at a time, some amount of 
knowledge about a domain. We want to know, therefore, both what it is to know more in an 
unrestricted sense, and what it is to know more about a subject or domain.
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Having broadened our scope, we can in turn narrow it. To understand what it is to know 
more, one has to understand what it is to know anything, period. is is a familiar problem and 
one I set aside here. e focus is rather on understanding the measure involved. Assume we know 
what knowledge is (justi!ed true belief, warranted true belief, virtuously formed true belief, etc.). 
What is it to have more of that?
I will start by examining and arguing against a very natural approach to the measure of 
knowledge, one that appeals to cardinality and especially to the natural numbers. is approach 
generates an enumerative or aggregative model on which how much is a matter of how many. 
Some of the complaints are merely suggestive and hence are designed to discredit, rather than 
disprove, the view. But some complaints are fatal (it will be clear which are which). I then turn to 
the quasi-spatial notion of counterfactual distance and show how a model that appeals to distance 
avoids the problems that plague appeals to cardinality. But such a model faces fatal problems of its 
own. Re$ection on what the distance model gets right and where it goes wrong motivates a third 
approach, which appeals not to cardinality, nor to counterfactual distance, but to similarity.2 I 
close the paper by advocating this model and brie$y discussing some of its signi!cance for 
epistemic normativity. In particular, I argue that the 'trivial truths' objection to the view that 
truth is the goal of inquiry rests on an unstated, but false, assumption about the measure of 
knowledge, and suggest that a similarity model preserves truth as the aim of belief in an 
intuitively satisfying way.
Before I turn to these tasks, three preliminary remarks. First, I have framed the issue as 
one about knowledge, about the having of more of it. However, my real interest is in ignorance, 
in the having of less of it. Or to use a normative term, in the amelioration of it. I think the 
2 e proposal here advanced was developed independently of, but has much in common with, similarity-
based accounts of verisimilitude in the philosophy of science. See especially Hilpinen 1976. Lewis (1986a, 
24-27) as usual has apt insights. ere are signi!cant diﬀerences in argument, detail and consequences, and 
I suspect that those who have worked to develop similarity-based accounts of verisimilitude would be 
hesitant to embrace much of what I say. Regardless of whether they would think I am right, it should be 
clear that I think they are right, at least in outline if not in detail.
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conceptual diﬀerence is interesting and subtle and that ignorance is a more fundamental notion. 
But I will by and large avoid this for now and focus in the main on knowledge, since it is a more 
natural way to frame most of the points.
e second preliminary remark: so far I have raised two questions: “What is it to know 
more?”, and “What is it to have some amount of knowledge?”. We should note, however, that the 
fact that there is something it is for one thing to be more F than another may not entail that there 
is something it is for each to be some amount of F. For instance, consider the property hardness.3 
It may be that hardness should be understood as fundamentally comparative: object 1 is harder 
than object 2 if and only if object 1 can abrade object 2 but object 2 cannot abrade object 1. 
Hence there could be a fact of the matter concerning whether object 1 or object 2 is harder, 
without there being a fact of the matter concerning how hard either object is, where this is 
something like some amount of hardness. I do not know whether, with knowledge, the 
fundamental intuition is that it is possible to know more and less than one does, or whether it is 
that a subject has at a time some amount of knowledge. I will, however, focus principally on what 
it is to know more and less, leaving open whether one knows more and less in virtue of having 
some amount of knowledge. For this reason, when I talk about the measure of knowledge, and in 
various places of needing a metric for knowledge, this should be interpreted as only asking for at 
least an account of what grounds an ordinal ranking of epistemic states or agents.
e !nal preliminary remark concerns whether there is always a fact of the matter 
concerning the ordinal ranking of any two subjects in terms of how much they know. Sure, you 
know more now than you did when you were 10 years old. But does that commit us to there 
being a fact of the matter concerning how, say, you and I compare? Could it not be the case that 
how much you know and how much I know are incomparable? e same worry applies to 
knowledge of domains. Some mathematician specializes in topology, while her colleague works on 
3 anks to Hugh Mellor for this point and the example.
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set theory. Need there be a fact of the matter about whether one knows more about mathematics? 
Or whether the topologist knows more about topology than the set theorist knows about set 
theory? Or than some biologist knows about biology?
ere are reasonable worries here, but we have good reason to be skeptical about the 
incomparability claim. Grant that we have much weaker intuitions that there must be a fact of 
the matter concerning whether the topologist or the set theorist knows more about mathematics. 
e best explanation of this is not that there is no fact of the matter, but that the case as described 
is such that it doesn't push us toward any of the three possibilities. In contrast, think about how 
much you (assuming you are no topologist) know about topology, compared to how much the set 
theorist knows about set theory. You know something about topology; but in this case it seems 
obvious that the set theorist knows more about set theory. But if so then the domains themselves 
are not incomparable in regard to size or magnitude. Return now to the unrestricted case: while 
we may have no strong views about whether you know more than I do, if I were to suddenly 
suﬀer some kind of brain damage that knocked out everything I know other than, say, what I 
know about my hometown and the people living there, how much you know and how much I 
know would not seem at all incomparable. e best explanation of this is not, I think, that states 
of knowledge go from comparable to incomparable as they become closer in measure – indeed, 
that is not even intelligible.4
e Measure as Cardinality or Counting
We often speak of knowledge as if it comes in pieces. If S has a true, justi!ed belief (or whatever), 
S has a piece of knowledge. Hence, one may think, how much a person knows is given by how 
many pieces of knowledge she has. Whoever has the most pieces wins. We can cast this view as:
S1 at t1 knows more than S2 at t2 = there is a number n1 such that the number of 
S1's true justi!ed beliefs = n1, and there is a 
4anks to Nick Denyer for good advice on how to express this point.
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number n2 such that the number of S2's true 
justi!ed beliefs = n2, and n1 > n2
is approach counts beliefs; whoever has the greatest number of beliefs that meet certain 
qualitative criteria (true, justi!ed, etc.) knows the most. Similarly, presumably, on this account 
whoever has the greatest number of beliefs concerning some particular domain that meet those 
qualitative criteria knows the most about that domain:
NT2011 knows more about        = there is a number n1 such that the number of  
New York than NT2001 does NT2011's true justi!ed beliefs about New York = n1, and 
there is a number n2 such that the number of NT2001's 
true justi!ed beliefs about New York = n2, and n1 > n2
is domain-speci!c account requires re!nement; chie$y, we would want to know what it is for a 
belief to be about a domain. But I won't dwell on that, for what I want to focus on is the idea 
that the quantity involved in knowing more is cardinality. is is perhaps the most natural story, 
but there are deep problems with it.
A !rst problem is that it may well be that every believing subject's beliefs are 
denumerably in!nite and hence that the cardinality of the belief sets of any two believers is the 
same. e claim that we each have a denumerable in!nity of beliefs will seem absurd on some 
views of what mental representation involves, but the issue is not straightforward and cannot be 
settled here. e important point is that if we each have a denumerable in!nity of true, justi!ed 
beliefs, as some theories of mental representation mandate, yet diﬀer in how much we know, then 
the measure of knowledge is not cardinality. is is because (trivially) every countable in!nity has 
the same cardinality.
e problem is familiar in a diﬀerent context, since it infects Davidson's claim that 
charity requires that we interpret a subject such that most of her beliefs are true. Usually, 
Davidson casts the principle of charity in terms of number:
e nature of correct interpretation guarantees both that a large number of our simplest 
beliefs are true, and that the nature of those beliefs is known to others. (1991, 160, italics 
mine)
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He is following Neil Wilson, who in the original formulation of the principle of charity put it in 
terms of numbers: We translate in a way that makes “the largest possible number of statements 
true.” (Wilson 1959, quoted by Quine in Word and Object II, §13) But Davidson is sensitive to 
the problem of making sense of the principle so rendered:
e basic methodological precept is, therefore, that a good theory of interpretation 
maximizes agreement. Or, given that sentences are in!nite in number…a better word 
might be optimize. (2001a, 169. Italics his.)
Davidson’s issue, and the worry he runs into, are close to our own. In both cases, the problem is 
that an analysis of amount (of doxastic agreement between speaker and interpreter, or of amount 
of true belief ) seems to founder in the face of the possibility that an in!nite number of 
propositions fall within the content of a subject’s believing.5
e problem is decisive for the matter at hand if we shift from talking about how much 
one knows to how ignorant one is. is is because those who are convinced our beliefs are !nite 
will almost certainly concede that the number of truths is in!nite.6 Yet if the number of truths is 
in!nite, then each of us is ignorant of just as many truths as we ever have been. e argument is a 
reductio – since I am obviously not as ignorant as I was when I was 10 years old, and since the 
cardinality of the set of truths of which I am ignorant now is identical to the cardinality of the set 
of truths of which I was ignorant then, the metric involved is something else.
Moreover, move back now from ignorance to knowledge and consider our epistemic 
complements, where these are subjects who know exactly those truths that we do not. e 
epistemic complement of my 10-year-old self knows more than the epistemic complement of my 
5 There might be easy cases. If two subjects each have a denumerable in!nity of true, justi!ed beliefs, but 
the !rst subject’s beliefs are a proper subset of the second subject’s beliefs, then we can understand how the 
!rst has more even though both have an in!nite number: the cardinality of the sets would be the same, but 
the second set would contain the !rst.  But such cases are too rare to be helpful: I know more now than I 
did when I was 10 years old, but I knew some stuﬀ then that I don't know now. (Alex Oliver has made just 
this point in regard to measuring the ontological economy of a theory by appeal to the number of entities 
that exist according to the theory. (1996, 7))
6 Indeed, uncountably in!nite. But whether there are a countable or uncountable in!nity of truths, and if 
the latter, which uncountable in!nity, is immaterial to the point made in this paragraph.
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current self. Yet if the number of truths is in!nite, then the cardinality of their sets of true 
justi!ed beliefs is the same. So again the measure must be something else.
So long as the number of truths is in!nite, the cardinality of the sets of true justi!ed 
beliefs held by my various epistemic complements does not vary, even though some know more 
than others. But we might insist that we have a !nite number of beliefs, and hope that for more 
humble beings like us, knowing more or less will supervene on greater or lesser cardinality of the 
set of propositions known: if you have 235,465,443 true justi!ed beliefs and I have 157,452,343 
true justi!ed beliefs, then you know more than I do. In other words, even if the measure of 
knowledge does not consist in cardinality, counting may be all that's needed to determine how 
much is known by a being with a !nite number of beliefs. A serious problem with this, however, 
is that it is quite unclear whether it is right to think of beliefs as the kinds of things a person 
could have some number of, on the grounds that they may lack the individuation conditions that 
are required for the idea to be intelligible. At times this, rather than the claim that a subject's 
beliefs are in!nite, seems to be what worries Davidson about the numeric rendering of the 
principle of charity:
is way of stating the position [that is, in terms of number of beliefs] can at best be 
taken as a hint, since there is no useful way to count beliefs, and so no clear meaning 
to the idea that most of a person’s beliefs are true. A somewhat better way to put the 
point is to say there is a presumption in favor of the truth of a belief that coheres with a 
signi!cant mass of belief. (2001b, 138-139)
e worry is not Davidson's alone. Consider Michael Williams's remark that:
No one has the faintest idea how many beliefs he has, or even how to go about counting 
them. is isn’t just because we have so many beliefs that we wouldn’t know where to 
begin, though this is perfectly true. Rather, we lack clear criteria for individuating beliefs 
– that is, saying when beliefs are the same and diﬀerent – without which there is no 
possibility of counting. Asking how many beliefs I have is like asking how many drops of 
water there are in a bucket: who’s to say? I believe that my dog is in the garden right now; 
do I also believe that he is not in the house, not in the basement, not in Siberia? Or are 
these beliefs somehow included in the original belief? (2001, 131, italics his)
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As Williams words the issue, it is unclear whether his worry is epistemic or metaphysical. If the 
problem is merely that we do not know how to individuate beliefs, there is no threat to an 
enumerative approach to understanding the measure of knowledge. But I take Williams’s point to 
be metaphysical rather than epistemic. It is not just that we do not know how to count beliefs; it 
is that they are not in principle countable.
e claim that beliefs are not in principle countable is remarkably common,7 but it is 
very puzzling, and less commonly explained and defended than expressed in passing. We do talk 
about individual beliefs, and in the seminar room no less than in the street. Williams, after all, 
denies that beliefs are countable but in the same passage refers to them as “many”. Moreover, 
surely, one wants to say, that here is a hand is one belief, that here is another is another. Why ever 
think, therefore, that beliefs are not in principle countable?
One might hope to support the non-countability of belief by appeal to direct intuition. 
Are we really comfortable saying that there is some number of beliefs we acquired yesterday, that 
at any given instant each of us has either an odd or even number of beliefs, that at the moment I 
have (for instance) 487,219,567 beliefs? To many philosophers, there is something deeply wrong 
with this, even if it is hard to say exactly what. At best, however, these intuitions give us reason to 
wonder whether belief is countable; they raise the question rather than answer it.
If believing subjects do not have some number of beliefs, it is not merely that they 
happen to fail to have some number of beliefs; it is that they could not have some number of 
beliefs. And the only way for that to be the case is if the notion of a belief is somehow defective. 
Not the notion of belief or believing, the notion of a belief. And two lines of argument for this 
conclusion are hinted at in the quotation from Williams above, both of which centre on the idea 
7 For instance, one often reads or hears remarks like the following: “[I]t probably makes no sense, strictly 
speaking, to talk of the number of things one believes....e prospects of arriving even at a principle for 
counting beliefs, let alone at an actual number of them, seem dim.” (Stroud, 2000, 6)
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that beliefs lack the individuation conditions that are required for it to be possible for a subject to 
have some number of beliefs.
First, one could argue that there are no criteria for belief identity, for saying when beliefs 
are the same or diﬀerent. is is what Williams is getting at when he says that we lack criteria for 
"saying when beliefs are the same and diﬀerent – without which there is no possibility of 
counting". It is an old thought, pressed hardest by Quine, who argued that we have no "standard 
of when to speak of propositions as identical and when as distinct." [1960, 200]  at there is a 
serious problem with understanding the identity conditions of beliefs and propositions has been 
widely acknowledged, even if it has not in general dimmed our enthusiasm for employing the 
concepts 'a belief' and 'a proposition'. But still, Quine's demand of no entity without identity is 
reasonable, and it is not clear whether, as Fodor and Lepore have put it, "the notion of content 
identity can be made metaphysically respectable". [1999, 1]
 I will not focus on this challenge, however, but on a second one, which I take to be more 
metaphysically interesting. One could grant that, or ignore whether, there are grounds that 
determine when beliefs (or propositions) are the same or diﬀerent, and worry instead that there is 
something unintelligible about the idea of exactly one belief.  A resolution of the issue is beyond 
the scope of this paper, as it involves not just the metaphysics of belief in particular but the more 
general and diﬃcult question of what it is to be one at all.8 On this point, therefore, my goal will 
be only to give some sense of the shape and character of the problem.
Consider Socrates's challenge to Meletus in e Apology:
8 Some, like Frege, think there is no question here, on the grounds that being one is not a property:
“It must strike us immediately as remarkable that every single thing should possess this property [dass 
jedes Ding diese Eigenschaft hätte]. It would be incomprehensible why we should still ascribe it 
expressly to a thing at all….It is not easy to imagine how language could have come to invent a word for 
a property which could not be of the slightest use for adding to the description of any object 
whatsoever.” [Grundlagen, §29, Austin translation]
But the mistake here is twofold. First, his remarks make sense only if one assumes an ontology of objects, as 
it is plain he does. But that is part of the very thing at issue. And second, even if what is, is one, there 
should be an explanation of this. Special thanks to Henry Laycock for !rst alerting me to this more general 
question.
10
Does any man, Meletus, believe in human activities who does not believe in 
humans?....Does any man who does not believe in horses believe in horsemen’s activities? 
Or in $ute-playing activities but not in $ute-players? No, my good sir, no man could. 
(27b)
Socrates is pointing to necessary connections between belief states: believing something at least 
sometimes metaphysically necessitates believing other things as well. is has become familiar in a 
strengthened form as the claim that it is impossible to believe anything without believing a great 
deal more. Wittgenstein put it with typical $air:
141. When we !rst begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition 
but a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.) (1969, 21)
To have an example at hand, consider the belief that higher education deserves public funding. 
Very plausibly, having this belief involves believing a great deal more about education, public 
funding, desert, and so on, where to believe a great deal more about education, public funding, 
desert, and so on in turn involves believing a great deal more about various other things. e idea 
is that someone who fails to have these other beliefs could not even be said to understand what it 
is for higher education to deserve public funding. But if they do not even understand what it 
would be for that to be true, they could scarcely think that it is true. Believing that higher 
education deserves public funding involves some minimal grasp of the truth-conditions of that 
proposition, and this in turn involves further belief.
Many are the fans of such holism, many the critics. What has not been adequately 
explored are its consequences for the intelligibility of the notion of an individual belief. Or more 
precisely, since the notion of an individual belief isn’t going to go away, what has not been 
adequately explored is whether this notion can be coherently understood in the way it needs to be 
for it to be the case that a subject’s believing has a cardinality.
If the driving idea of semantic or belief holism were merely that the existence of any 
belief entails the existence of a great many more beliefs, there would be no threat to the 
intelligibility of individual beliefs, any more than the fact that if anyone is a gang member then 
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lots of other people are threatens the intelligibility of individual gang members. But I take holism 
to be more the claim that believing that, for instance, higher education deserves public funding 
involves, not merely requires, believing other things as well. It is tempting to resort to a class of 
familiar dependence relations, to say for instance that the belief that higher education deserves 
public funding is constituted by or in some sense contains various other beliefs. Or to say that 
what it is to believe that higher education deserves public funding is more than merely to be in a 
state that necessitates that one is also, distinctly, in the state of believing various other things, but 
is rather to be in a state that is, in part, the believing of various other things. But these ways of 
putting  it, in terms of constitution, containment or parthood, are not right, for they suggest 
either mereological relations or (at least) asymmetric dependence. What semantic holism suggests 
is something more seamless, where beliefs bleed into one another. Even that is not the right way 
of putting it, since that makes it sound as if there are individual beliefs with fuzzy, bleeding edges. 
e idea instead is that believing takes chunks of propositional space as its object; we have bodies 
of belief, denoted by a mass noun, rather than beliefs, denoted by a count noun. e diﬀerence 
between thinking of holism as involving asymmetric dependence or parthood and this alternative 
picture is important, because if beliefs merely contain or depend upon other beliefs then counting 
is still possible. What is at issue is the very diﬀerent question of whether beliefs are properly 
understood as individuals at all.
David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson have sympathetically explored this 
alternative picture, although (as far as I know) not in a way that engages with the underlying, 
more general metaphysical issues. In a passage that eﬀectively captures our discussion of holism so 
far, they remark: 
What would it be like to believe that there's milk in the refrigerator, and nothing else? It 
seems as impossible as having money without the social and economic circumstances that 
give sense to something being money. To believe that there is milk in the refrigerator, you 
have to have enough by way of belief to count as understanding what milk is, what a 
12
refrigerator is, and what it is for one thing to be inside another. It takes a lot of belief to 
be any amount of belief. [2007, 196]
e key idea is that it is not merely that it takes a lot of belief to have any amount of belief, it 
takes a lot of belief to be any amount of belief. If this is right, then, necessarily, whenever we're 
talking about what we ordinarily call an individual belief (that here is a hand, that higher 
education deserves public funding, that there is milk in the refrigerator) we are talking about a lot 
of belief. Each is one belief, sure, if we must; but here 'individual belief' is something like 'a 
sentence-shaped portion of belief, the stuﬀ'. And the problem is that when we want to know how 
much someone believes or knows, we want to know the quantity of belief the stuﬀ, not the 
number of sentence-shaped portions of it.9 What we need is a measure on the stuﬀ, and ‘sentence-
shaped portion’ fails to provide one.
I have presented this line of argument as resting on semantic holism, but it may be 
possible to develop a substantially similar argument without this as an explicit commitment.
e !rst premise is that the extension of a concept is countable (and !nite) only if a 
certain condition is met:
e concept “letters in the word 'three'” isolates the t from the h, the h from the r, and so 
on. e concept “syllables in the word 'three'” picks out the word as a whole, and as 
indivisible in the sense that no part of it falls any longer under that same concept. Not all 
concepts possess this quality. We can, for example, divide up something falling under the 
concept “red” into parts in a variety of ways, without the parts thereby ceasing to fall 
under the same concept “red”. To a concept of this kind no !nite number will belong. 
e proposition asserting that units are isolated and indivisible can, accordingly, be 
formulated as follows:
Only a concept which isolates what falls under it in a de!nite manner, and which does 
not permit any arbitrary division into parts, can be a unit relative to a !nite number. 
(Grundlagen, §54)
9 Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson “explain away” the intuition that “there are speci!c individual beliefs and 
desires”. In their view, “there is your picture of how things are, and your picture of how you want them to 
be”. [233-236]
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ere is a lot packed into this, and Frege’s wording may not be wholly satisfactory. Geach 
provides a helpful elaboration which taken jointly with the passage from Frege should give us a 
serviceable enough idea of the condition for present purposes:
[O]nly in connection with some terms can the question be asked how many so-and-so’s 
there are. For example, although we have the phrase ‘the seven seas’, nobody could set out 
to determine how many seas there are; the term “sea” does not determine any division of 
the water area in the world into seas the way that the term “letter” (in the typographic 
senses) does determine a division of the printed matter in the world into letters.10 [63]
e second premise is that belief does not meet this condition. ink of the concept 
"believed by NT". What I believe, at least very plausibly, permits arbitrary division into parts, and 
those parts are not, again at least very plausibly, isolated in the sense of discrete. To be sure, we 
can nominally specify these divisions – I believe that here is a hand, that higher education 
deserves public funding, that there is milk in the refrigerator, and so on. But our ability to 
nominally specify divisions in what I believe is not all that's needed for what I believe to be 
countable; it must also be the case that there exists a privileged set of divisions such that they 
jointly specify all, only, and without overlap what I believe.
Elsewhere Frege, with something very diﬀerent in mind, provides a nice example of the 
problem:
In the sentence: 'Because ice is less dense than water, it $oats on water' we have
(1) Ice is less dense than water
(2) If anything is less dense than water, it $oats on water;
(3) Ice $oats on water.
e third thought, however, need not be explicitly introduced, since it is contained in the 
remaining two. On the other hand, neither the !rst and third nor the second and third 
combined would furnish the sense of our sentence. [1892, 76-77]
We have here four thoughts, all of which I believe. In one sense they are distinct thoughts; each is 
such that it is not identical to any of the others. But they are not distinct in the sense that if this 
10 Geach also makes clear (64) why the issue of countability is distinct from that of identity. at is, there 
can be criteria of identity without criteria of countability. “But it is not necessary, in order that 'the same A' 
shall make sense, for the question 'How many As?' to make sense; we can speak of the same gold…but 
'How many golds?' does not make sense”.
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were the totality of what I believed, I would believe exactly four things. On the face of it, the 
concept ‘believed by NT’ permits arbitrary division of its extension into parts, and fails to isolate 
what falls under it in a de!nite manner.
It may be tempting to think the foregoing discussion concerns merely the vehicle of 
believing rather than what is believed. at is, one may want to object: “Fine, you can’t cut up a 
person’s belief state and count, but that’s irrelevant. What matters is whether some number of 
propositions fall within the content of a person’s believing. If, say, 987 do, then the person has 
987 beliefs.” is objection misses the point, however: the discussion of the previous section 
concerns content, not vehicle.
e same issue comes up in a debate between Lewis and Stalnaker. In “Reduction of 
Mind”, Lewis describes a map-like theory of belief as an alternative to the language-of-thought 
hypothesis: 
A serious issue…concerns the relation between the whole and the parts of a 
representation. Suppose I have a piece of paper according to which, inter alia, 
Collingwood is east of Fitzroy. Can I tear the paper up so that I get one snippet that has 
exactly the content that Collingwood is easy of Fitzroy, nothing more and nothing less? If 
the paper is covered in writing, maybe I can; for maybe ‘Collingwood is east of Fitzroy’ is 
one of the sentences written there. But if the paper is a map, any snippet according to 
which Collingwood is east of Fitzroy will be a snippet according to which more is true 
besides. For instance, I see no way to lose the information that they are adjacent, and that 
a street runs along the border. And I see no way to lose all information about their size 
and shape….
Mental representation is language-like to the extent that parts of the content are 
the content of parts of the representation. If our beliefs are ‘a map…by which we steer’, 
as Ramsey said, then they are to that extent not language-like. And to that extent, also, it 
is misleading to speak in the plural of beliefs. What is one belief? No snippet of a map is 
big enough that, determinately, something is true according to it, and also small enough 
that, determinately, nothing is true according to any smaller part of it. If mental 
representation is map-like...then ‘beliefs’ is a bogus plural. You have beliefs the way you 
have the blues, or the mumps, or the shivers. (1999, 311, italic his)
At !rst glance, the argument is compelling: if belief is map-like, then although there is a whole 
representation, there is no exhaustive decomposition of this whole representation into parts – 
there is no way to cut the whole representation into snippets such that each snippet is exactly one 
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belief. But that is beside the point, since Lewis appears to be talking about the vehicle of 
representation rather than about the content of representation. Stalnaker makes just this objection 
in “Lewis on Intentionality”:
Lewis suggests that if the way information is represented is holistic – map-like, or 
hologram-like, rather than sentence-like – then plural propositional attitude terms such 
as ‘beliefs’ are ‘bogus plurals’: ‘You have beliefs the way you have the blues, or the 
mumps, or the shivers’. But this is not right, since whatever the nature of the vehicle or 
vehicles of mental representation, the plural noun ‘beliefs’ does not refer to that vehicle, 
or to those vehicles. What it refers to is the contents of a representation – to the 
propositions that are believed. And even if there is a single map-like internal structure in 
a believer that make[s] it the case that she has the beliefs that she has, that structure will 
determine a plurality of propositions that are believed…..[W]hatever the character of 
what is going on in a person’s head when she has beliefs, these goings on should not be 
confused with what the person believes. (2004, 208, italics his)
To a point, Stalnaker is right. What is at issue when we are wondering whether a subject’s beliefs 
are countable is whether the content of her believing is countable, not whether the vehicle by 
which she believes what she believes can be decomposed into smaller entities that correspond one-
to-one with what is believed. But he is right only to a point because what Lewis proposes may be 
true of the vehicle is very plausibly true of the content. What is one content, or one bit of 
content? What is a propositional content that is exactly one proposition – nothing more and 
nothing less? We want to answer with a sentence and say the sentence picks out or expresses 
exactly one thing – that higher education deserves public funding, that ice $oats on water because 
it is less dense than water, that Collingwood is east of Fitzroy. But for any of these propositions to 
be true is for much to be true – since it takes a lot of truth to be any amount of truth.
We should not underestimate the diﬃculties with articulating this view in a satisfactory 
way. For now, we should take it as helping us focus on the heart of the issue. e question of how 
many true justi!ed beliefs a person has is really the question of how many facts she knows, of how 
many truths lie within her ken. Part of the diﬃculty with understanding what it is to have some 
number of true justi!ed beliefs is the diﬃculty in understanding how to draw boundaries around 
what falls within someone's ken (that the dog is in the yard, or also that the dog is not on 
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Jupiter?). But the diﬃculty is also that of understanding how to draw boundaries within what is 
known, that is, of understanding what it is for there to be some number of truths or propositions. 
Does the world divide into facts? Are there some number of truths out there, lying in wait to be 
scooped up in our doxastic nets?
We need not explore these questions further here since a problem remains, even if there 
are some number of truths, and even if each of us knows some !nite number of them. Grant that 
a person's knowledge decomposes into knowledge of some !nite number of truths and let us 
suppose that you know 235,465,443 and that I know 157,452,343; this will entail that you know 
more than I do only on the substantial assumption that what is true divides into truths of the  
same size. It is hardly clear what this means (that is the very thing at issue!). But what is clear is 
that the fact that the extension of a concept consists of, or can be decomposed exhaustively into, a 
!nite number of individuals does not entail that the correct measure on the extension is 
cardinality. For example, consider the theological concept of sinning and assume it is in principle 
possible to count token instances of sinning.  What matters on Judgement Day is surely not how 
many sins a person has committed, but how much sin. You can count sins, but that is no way to 
measure sinning. is general point is relevant because there is intuitive reason to think that the 
truths we know are, like the sins we commit, not all the same size.
ere are two questions to distinguish. e !rst is whether ordinary 'individual truths', 
of the kind we express in everyday natural language sentences, diﬀer in size. e second is 
whether, if what we know decomposes into some !nite number of truths, these bottom-level 
truths diﬀer in size. e answer to the !rst question is obviously yes: compare the truth that ice 
$oats on water with the truth that ice $oats on water because it is less dense than water. Less 
obvious, but nonetheless intuitive, is a diﬀerent sort of example. Suppose it is true that the 
universe underwent massive exponential expansion shortly after the Big Bang, and that the 
number of threads in the shirt I am wearing is even. Is there no sense in which in knowing the 
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!rst truth one knows more than in knowing the second truth? e idea is not that one knows 
something more interesting or more prudentially valuable; whether that is the case turns on who 
you are and what you want. e suggestion instead is that knowing the former truth increases 
one's epistemic contact with the world much more than does knowing the second truth. Or 
consider as another example the diﬀerence between knowing that some object is green and 
knowing that some object is grue. If I know that there is a green object under my desk, I seem to 
know more than I do if I know that there is a grue object under my desk. Or compare knowing 
that there are electrons to knowing that something is called an 'electron' in English.
e answer to the !rst question is obvious, but not what is at issue. What we want to 
know is whether diﬀerences in the size of truths expressed by ordinary language sentences reduce 
to diﬀerences in the cardinality of the metaphysically basic veritic elements into which, we are 
supposing, such truths can be decomposed. is strategy suggests itself immediately with the !rst 
example, involving truths about the $oating of ice, even if things turn to slush a cut or two in. 
But one might also hope this strategy will work with the second set of examples: maybe one 
knows more when one knows that the universe underwent massive exponential expansion shortly 
after the Big Bang than when one knows that the number of threads in the shirt I am wearing is 
even, but this is only because both pieces of knowledge are compounds of basic elements, and the 
former compound has more (i.e., on this reading, a greater number of ) basic elements than the 
latter.
is is the second question, and it cannot be answered as directly as the !rst. For one 
thing, we don't have the slightest idea of what the bottom-level truths would look like, as it were. 
Certainly we can bring no examples to hand: that is the force of the preceding section on holism. 
But if we grant that such truths exist, in the sense that what is expressed by an ordinary true 
sentence of natural language decomposes into some !nite number of them, then we need a way to 
assess whether they diﬀer in size. is we can do: What we need to do is imagine a possible 
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situation that meets three conditions. First, it is one in which one subject knows more than 
another. Since we do not know what it is for one subject to know more than another, we will have 
to be guided by intuition here. Second, it is one in which the subject who knows more does not 
know some greater number of bottom-level, or atomic, truths. Since we do not know what such 
truths look like, or how many are in this true sentence and how many in that, we will have to be 
careful to ensure, by stipulation if necessary, that every atomic truth known by the subject who 
knows more is matched by at least one atomic truth known by the subject who knows less. And 
third, it is one in which each subject knows some !nite number of atomic truths. e 
compossibility of the !rst two conditions demonstrates the measure of knowledge does not 
consist in the cardinality of atomic truths known. But the third condition ensures the argument 
speaks to the broader point at issue, which is whether, even if the measure of knowledge does not 
consist in cardinality, counting may give the measure for beings with a !nite number of beliefs.
Compare Smith and Jones, who come into the world as ignorant as the rest of us, but 
who are blessed with extraordinary intellects, phenomenal memory, astute perception, and so on. 
Smith sets out to travel the world and in the fullness of time comes to know everything in the 
current, 30-volume Encyclopedia Britannica.  (at is, we are assuming everything in the EB is 
true and that he comes to know it all.) Jones, meanwhile, has been trapped his whole life in a 
small, windowless room, with nothing to read, no one who visits, no communicative pipeline at 
all to the world outside his room. But the room has a small and crude tape measure and so Jones 
spends all his time pulling it out a certain distance, remembering what number it bears, and then 
repeating this process. When Smith discovers the strong nuclear force, Jones discovers that on the 
18,756,391 time he pulls out the tape measure it reads somewhere between 55 and 56 inches. 
When Smith discovers the chemical process that converts carbon dioxide into organic compounds 
using energy from sunlight, Jones discovers that on the 25,234,344 time he pulls out the tape 
measure it reads around 43 inches. When Smith discovers that the universe contains many 
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billions of galaxies, Jones discovers that on the 32,535,113 time he pulls out the tape measure, it 
reads – lo – somewhere between 55 and 56 inches again. And so on. Since we don't know how 
many atomic truths Smith has learned, let us stipulate that Jones works quickly enough that for 
every atomic truth Smith learns, Jones learns one of his tape-measure-pulling truths. (I assume 
that each of these truths is at least one atomic truth; surely, if the truths expressed by ordinary 
sentences decompose into atomic truths, each tape-measure truth decomposes into at least a 
handful.) Finally, let us agree that the number of atomic truths known by Smith is !nite, and so 
too for Jones. If this were not the case, then since what they know is not diﬀerent in kind to what 
you and I know, it will turn out that you and I also know an in!nite number of atomic truths, 
and the whole issue will be moot.
In this situation, it seems to me, there is no serious question that Smith knows more than 
Jones. is claim will not be intelligible if you import into the meaning of “knows more” the 
theoretical claim that “knows more” = “knows some greater number of truths”. e idea is to 
back away from such theoretical commitments when you think about the situation. Smith knows 
a great deal; that can't be doubted. But Jones's cognitive labours have got him almost nowhere. 
He has learned unspeakably many truths but remains for all that massively, almost wholly, 
ignorant.
Let's try a diﬀerent situation, this time restricting ourselves to knowledge of a domain. 
Smith knows everything in the Encyclopedia Britannica about apples, whereas Jones knows a 
zillion truths of the following form: he has a proper name A that in fact denotes apples, and he 
knows ~(A = n1), ~(A = n2), ~(A = nn), where n1...nn are points on some one inch line. In this case, 
it seems clear he is massively ignorant, almost wholly ignorant, of apples, even though he knows 
as many truths about apples as you please. Why think this? Because he hasn't a clue what an apple 
is. Smith knows far fewer truths about apples, but for all that vastly more.11
11 One might object that Jones can't be said to know anything about apples (and hence not even that apples 
are not identical to this point, not identical to that point, etc.) unless he has some minimal grasp of what an 
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I said there is no serious question that Smith knows more; but there is a serious question 
of why Smith knows more. A !rst thought might be that (to discuss the !rst example) Smith can 
tell the diﬀerence, or discern, his world from more worlds. But this is not right, since there are 
just as many worlds compatible with what Smith knows as compatible with what Jones knows 
(in!nitely many). But the thought is in the right area, since what it points toward is the idea that 
reality is more like how Smith takes it to be than it is like how Jones takes it to be. To be sure, 
neither is wrong about anything – that is built into the example. But the world as Smith takes it 
to be is much more like the world as it is than is Jones's world. So too in the example restricted to 
the domain of apples. ere are just as many non-apple possibilia that Smith cannot rule out as 
apples as there are that Jones cannot rule out as apples (in!nitely many).  But the things that 
Smith can't rule out as apples are much more like apples than the things that Jones can't rule out 
as apples. For all Jones knows, he himself could be an apple, and anyone whose picture of apples 
doesn't rule out that he himself is an apple can hardly be said to know very much about apples.
What is at issue is again whether cardinality exhausts the structure of what is true. We 
already have a decisive argument against this (the argument that appeals to my various epistemic 
complements), but it is instructive to look at David Lewis's remarks on abundant properties, for 
abundant properties are (simplifying a little) just those picked out by well-formed predicates of a 
possible language.12
apple is, and this isn't supplied merely by having a term that, thanks to the right causal connection, picks 
them out. We might take this objection to prove the point, but to avoid arguing that here, we can modify 
the example to give Jones whatever minimal grasp of apples is required for him to have apples as a possible 
object of thought. Let both Smith and Jones begin with this minimal grasp, and let Jones learn a zillion 
truths of the form 'no apple has ever had its centre of gravity at n1', etc., and let Smith learn everything in 
the Encyclopedia Britannica about apples. Smith will learn tons about apples, Jones almost nothing. Or to 
put the point another way, at the end of this process Smith knows much more about apples than Jones 
does.
12 “e abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously 
disjunctive, as you please....ere is one of them for any condition we could write down, even if we could 
write at in!nite length and even if we could name all those things that must remain nameless because they 
fall outside our acquaintance.” [1986a, 59-60]
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Because properties are so abundant, they are undiscriminating. Any two things share 
in!nitely many properties, and fail to share in!nitely many others. at is so whether the 
two things are perfect duplicates or utterly dissimilar. us properties do nothing to 
capture facts of resemblance. at is work more suited to the sparse universals. Likewise, 
properties do nothing to capture the causal powers of things. Almost all properties are 
causally irrelevant, and there is nothing to make the relevant ones stand out from the 
crowd. Properties carve reality at the joints – and everywhere else as well. [1983, 346]
We should agree with Lewis that sharing (merely) abundant properties does not make for 
similarity. But when we re$ect on the fact that such properties are the semantic values of 
predicates, we should note the epistemic correlate: that knowing (merely) abundant truths about 
some entity does not help us know that entity. Here is an analogy: Suppose I want to duplicate 
some apple and to do this I make a list of its abundant properties and then build an object that 
shares a great many, perhaps in!nitely many, of those properties. If the object I build is an apple, 
then great, I may have duplicated the apple, or at least have come close to doing so. But I could 
have built Mount Everest – since it too shares many, indeed in!nitely many, properties with the 
apple I started with. But clearly I would not have come anywhere close to duplicating an apple by 
building Mount Everest. Part of the problem would be the fact that I would have gotten a lot 
wrong (apples are not covered year-round in snow and ice, for instance). But as much of the 
problem is that I would have gotten almost nothing right (even though I would have gotten an 
in!nite number of properties right). In exactly this way, if I aim in cognition to duplicate the 
world – not literally, but in a representation – then merely building a representation that has a 
content that shares many, even in!nitely many, properties with the world is no guarantee that I 
have come anywhere close to duplicating the world. I may have – but it depends not merely on 
how many properties I duplicate but on which properties I duplicate. An apple shares in!nitely 
many properties with the actual world and to each of these properties there corresponds some 
well-formed predicate in a possible language. But if I learned that all those predicates were true of 
reality (that the world had those properties) I would have learned very little about it. For instance, 
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I could not tell the diﬀerence between the actual world and an apple. Whatever it is that makes 
for greater or lesser knowledge (or greater and lesser ignorance), it is not exhausted by cardinality.
To sum up the problems with understanding the measure of knowledge by appeal to 
cardinality or counting: First, if each of us has an in!nite number of beliefs, as some theories of 
mental representation allege, or if there are an in!nite number of truths, as most philosophers 
would be inclined to grant, then the measure of knowledge does not consist in cardinality. 
Second, even the much weaker view that knowing more and less supervenes on greater and lesser 
!nite cardinality of the set of truths known faces a serious challenge, since it may not be 
intelligible that we know some number of truths at all. ird, even if there are some number of 
truths, and even if we restrict ourselves to subjects who know some !nite number of them, we 
could not determine how much a person knows by counting the truths that she believes, since 
cardinality does not exhaust the structure of what is true. Let us turn, therefore, to the second 
approach to the measure of knowledge, which appeals not to cardinality but to counterfactual 
distance between worlds.
e Measure as Counterfactual Distance
We have ways of thinking about quantity that don’t involve numbers. A large pizza is bigger than 
a small pizza. We can think of this partly in terms of number – the large pizza is some number of 
square inches, the small pizza is some number of square inches, and the !rst number > the second 
number. But we need not, and surely no hungry child does. Similarly, when cave people 
distinguished between big caves and little caves, they were not counting.  Moreover, in neither 
case can we think of the size solely in terms of number. What is involved is a spatial notion; 
bigger things are stretched out further, or take up more space. It is precisely the spatial 
extendedness of non-discrete stuﬀ such as soup that allows us to annex a number to a quantity 
(cup, teaspoon, decilitre) as a way to describe or capture quantitative diﬀerences.
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It is interesting to note, therefore, that when thinking about belief we often employ 
spatial notions. Perhaps the most familiar example is talk of beliefs forming a web, which 
construes our believing as either a two-dimensional plane or as a three-dimensional volume, both 
of which are extended regions. Another familiar example is talk of beliefs constraining epistemic 
space:
[T]he space of scenarios constitutes my epistemic space: the space of speci!c epistemic 
possibilities that are open to me a priori. If I had no empirical beliefs, all of epistemic 
space would be open to me. As I acquire empirical beliefs, my epistemic space is 
narrowed down. Any given belief will typically divide epistemic space into those 
epistemic possibilities that it endorses and those that it excludes. (Chalmers 2002, 610, 
italics his)
On this picture, the more one believes or knows, the smaller one’s doxastic or epistemic space. 
is spatial, or quasi-spatial, way of thinking about belief construes the content of our believing 
as a volume – as one comes to believe more, one’s doxastic space shrinks. Might this, therefore, be 
a way we could think about the measure of knowledge without relying on numerical notions?
e problem would seem to be that although belief content is here thought of in spatial 
terms, the measurement problem remains. How much does one’s epistemic space shrink when 
one comes to know, for instance, that higher education deserves public funding? Does a believer’s 
epistemic space shrink in volume by the same amount with each new belief, or do some beliefs 
make it shrink more (and if so, why)? How do we compare the size of the epistemic space of two 
believers? What we need is not merely a way of thinking of belief in spatial, or quasi-spatial, 
terms, we need a metric of this space.
One place we might look for such a metric is in familiar talk of counterfactual distance 
between worlds. Here, amount is construed in spatial, or quasi-spatial, terms: Possible world A is 
more diﬀerent in some respect from possible world B than it is from possible world C if and only 
if the distance between A and B is greater than the distance between A and C. ere are several 
ways such a model could be developed. Just to have an illustration at hand, one might say that 
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how much a subject knows is given by the distance between the actual world and her furthest 
away epistemic world, where an epistemic world is a world compatible with her knowledge:
S1 knows more than S2 = S2’s most remote epistemic world is further away from 
the actual world than S1’s most remote epistemic 
world.
Epistemic World of S = W is an epistemic world of subject S iﬀ W is such that 
for all p, if S knows p then p is true at W.
Most remote EW of S = W is S’s most remote epistemic world iﬀ W is an 
epistemic world of S and no epistemic world of S is 
further from the actual world than W.
A virtue of this kind of account is that numbers drop out of the picture – quantity is given by 
distance rather than numbers. But a further virtue of this approach is that it accommodates the 
fact that knowing some propositions contributes more to how much one knows than knowing 
others. is is because distance between worlds is a function not merely of how many things are 
diﬀerent between the worlds in question, whatever that might mean, if indeed it means anything 
at all, but of what those diﬀerences are. Some diﬀerences count for more. Some diﬀerences are 
bigger diﬀerences.
So, for instance, imagine two world-mates who share a belief system at a time, at least to 
the degree this is possible given that they are two believers rather than one (ignore de se beliefs, 
various other indexicals, etc.), and who have identical epistemic justi!cation or warrant for what 
they believe. ey know the same amount, and on the account above the amount they each know 
is given by the distance between the actual world and their furthest away epistemic world. 
Suppose further that neither subject has any belief one way or the other concerning whether the 
number of threads in my shirt is even, and no belief one way or the other concerning whether 
there are electrons. Now add to the !rst believer a justi!ed true belief that the number of threads 
in my shirt is even. Prior to adding this belief, the subject’s furthest away epistemic world was one 
in which the number of threads in my shirt is odd. at is because it is further away than a 
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possible world that is identical except for the fact that the number of threads in my shirt is even. 
With the belief concerning the number of threads in my shirt being even added, therefore, the 
subject’s furthest away epistemic world jumps a little closer. Not much closer, but closer 
nonetheless. But now imagine adding to the other subject a justi!ed true belief that there are 
electrons. at subject’s furthest away epistemic world jumps signi!cantly closer to the actual 
world, since a world in which there are no electrons is much further away from the actual world 
than a world in which there are, holding everything else as much as possible the same. In other 
words, whether or not there are electrons is a big diﬀerence, whereas whether the number of 
threads in my shirt is even or odd is a little diﬀerence. Hence this approach accounts for intuitive 
judgments that one knows more by knowing, for instance, that there are electrons than by 
knowing that the number of threads in my shirt is even. You know more by knowing the !rst 
truth because in knowing it you greatly reduce the distance between the world as it is and the 
world as, for all you know, it could be.
Whatever the virtues of an account like this, it would face a host of familiar problems. 
For instance, it may not have the resources to explain what it is for one person to know more 
mathematics, or metaphysics, or morality, or about anything else where necessary truth is 
involved. is is because necessary truths are true in every possible world and thus believing, or 
failing to believe, a necessary truth would make no diﬀerence to the distance between the actual 
world and one’s furthest away epistemic world. And an account like this seems committed to the 
very odd consequence that once one knows p, coming to know whatever propositions p entails 
adds nothing to how much one knows. is is because as soon as one knows p the distance 
between one’s furthest away epistemic world and the actual world contracts to the distance at 
which p and everything it entails is true. What is at issue is not merely logical entailment in the 
sense of idealized a priori derivability. For suppose we knew all and only the microphysical facts. 
Much that uncontroversially supervenes on the microphysical is such that, very plausibly, we 
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would come to know more if we were to come to know it. Examples include all the truths of 
chemistry, biology, geology and the other special sciences, as well as such mundane observations 
as that there are a number of people in this room at the moment.
But familiar problems aside, there is a more basic problem with this kind of approach. 
e proposal identi!es amount of knowledge with counterfactual distance, but this merely pushes 
the bubble elsewhere under the rug.13 For there just is no clear, well-worked-out account of what 
such distance is – what that metaphor means or amounts to. ere are in fact two problems here. 
First, we do not really have any good accounts of what criteria determine distance. ere are 
incomplete gestures,14 but these are as much an expression of what needs to be explained as they 
are an explanation of it. And second, accounts that have been adumbrated appeal to notions of 
quantity that are as opaque as, and perhaps even involve, that which is involved in knowing more. 
I here have in mind the notion of amount of similarity. e point may be hard to see, since it is 
commonly said that counterfactual distance is overall similarity. But that is elision; counterfactual 
distance is overall similarity under some system of weights and measures of similarity in particular 
respects. Fledgling accounts of counterfactual distance rest on, rather than explicate, the notion of 
similarity. 
In light of these problems, if our theory of the metric involved in knowledge reduces it to 
the metric involved in counterfactual distance, one might well worry that our eﬀorts at theorizing 
haven’t brought us any closer to understanding that which we are theorizing about. Note, though, 
that there would still be virtues to this kind of account, even if the bubble remained. For it would 
assimilate one problem, that of how to understand how much a subject knows, to another 
problem, that of how to understand counterfactual distance, which we want to !gure out for 
other reasons. It would not solve any problems, but it would leave us with one fewer.
13 anks to Kelly Trogdon for suggesting this turn of phrase.
14 e.g., Lewis 1979.
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We have then two classes of objection to the quasi-spatial approach – what I described as 
familiar problems, which point to peculiar and implausible consequences of a distance-between-
worlds model, and what we can think of as a foundational objection, which insists the approach 
does not solve the problem but merely relocates it. Re$ection on both strands of  objection can 
lead us to a third approach, which appeals not to cardinality, nor to counterfactual distance, but 
to similarity. is approach will avoid at least many of the problems that threaten the cardinality 
and distance models. And it will preserve what the distance model gets right, which is that 
knowing more isn't a matter of increasing the cardinality of the set of truths known, but should 
instead be understood by appeal to the notion of reducing diﬀerence between the world and the 
world as it is represented as being. It will also expand the scope of the theoretical assimilation that 
was oﬀered as a virtue of the distance model. e bubble will remain, but it will have been 
relocated from one centred just on the measure of knowledge to one that is centred on a relation 
that features widely, centrally, and probably indispensably throughout philosophy and the 
sciences.
e Measure as Similarity
A central weakness of the counterfactual distance proposal is that it appeals to a relation holding 
between possible worlds, which are maximal, in the sense of settling every question. is is what 
generates the problem of understanding how we come to know more when we come to know 
truths entailed by, or that supervene on, what we already know, and the problem that knowing 
necessary truths adds nothing to how much one knows.  We can, however, preserve the virtues of 
the distance proposal if we construe  'amount known' by appeal to a distance-like relation that 
holds between entities when at least one is sub-maximal (not a complete way or speci!cation of 
how things could be). To satisfy this criterion, one might appeal to “partial worlds” and take there 
to be a distance relation between partial worlds, just as there is between worlds, or between partial 
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worlds and the actual world. But this is to look for smoke when we already have the !re. We have 
a relation and relata that are familiar, in broad use, and probably indispensable: the relation of 
similarity and the relata of representations and what they represent.
Similarity holds sub-maximally. is point is not demonstrated by pointing to two apples 
and an orange and remarking that the two apples are more similar to one another than either is to 
the orange. For although neither of the apples, nor the orange, is a world, each is a maximal way 
that a thing could be. at is why although no actual apple or orange is a world, any apple or 
orange could be; a lonely (in the Kim/Langton/Lewis sense) apple or orange  would settle every 
question. Or, to put it another way, for every apple, every orange, and every property, the apple or 
orange either has that property or lacks it. But the point is demonstrated by pointing to the 
similarity relation that holds between a representation and what it represents. Here I do not mean 
between a vehicle of representation and what it represents – I mean between the content of a 
representation and what it is a representation of. Consider a painting of Genghis Kahn. It is 
similar to him in certain ways. It is made of carbon, came into existence after Socrates did, has 
never been to Jupiter, and so on. But it (the painting) is not sub-maximal – for every property, it 
either has it or lacks it. But the painting's representation of Genghis Kahn represents an 
incomplete way that an entity could be. For instance, it does not specify what fundamental 
particles compose him, or even whether he is composed of fundamental particles. It leaves open 
the year of his birth, whom he loves, what he regrets, whether he has ever tasted cheese. And so 
on. Nothing could be just as Genghis Kahn is represented as being. But for all that, there is a 
similarity relation between Genghis Kahn and Genghis Kahn as he is represented as being.15
e point here is made by appeal to paintings, but it is a general point about 
representation. e government issues an edict and the people riot. Newspapers report on the 
15 is should be read not that Genghis Kahn is represented as being such that he has indeterminate 
properties, but rather that Genghis Kahn is represented such that it is indeterminate which properties he 
has.
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uprising, and variously represent the event as being thus and so. e reports are, of course, 
incomplete; who would want them to be otherwise? But for all that, they may diﬀer in terms of 
how similar the riot is to how they represent it as being.
Because similarity holds sub-maximally, an account of the measure of knowledge that 
construes it as the similarity between the world and the representation of it aﬀorded by a subject's 
knowledge avoids what I called familiar problems that plague the counterfactual distance 
proposal. It is also immune to the problems that threaten an appeal to cardinality. at two 
representations each share in!nite properties with what they represent is no bar to the one 
representation being more similar to the represented entity than the other, as Lewis's remark 
about abundant properties reminds us. And we can endorse a similarity model of the measure of 
knowledge without committing to the claim that what is true decomposes into isolated, non-
arbitrary countables, just as we can say that two oranges are more similar to each other than they 
are to some apple without committing to the claim that each object's being as it is decomposes 
into the instantiation of some cardinal number of properties. A similarity model also 
accommodates the fact that knowing some truths contributes more to how much one knows than 
knowing other truths: How similar some manufactured object is to an apple depends not merely 
on how many abundant properties it has in common with the apple, assuming that is even an 
intelligible claim, but on what those properties are, and for just this reason – since abundant 
properties are the semantic values of predicates – how similar one's knowing representation of 
some object is to the object itself depends not merely on how many truths one knows about it but 
on what those truths are.
An account that appeals to similarity avoids these problems while expanding the 
theoretical gain of the counterfactual distance proposal. at is, the distance model did not 
purport to solve the problem but rather reduced it to another problem, that of understanding 
distance between worlds. We express the similarity relation that holds between a representation 
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and what it represents in various ways. All are opaque: likeness, !t, !delity, accuracy, resemblance, 
correspondence.  But the core notion is that of similarity and this notion, though not well 
understood, is one that we are stuck with already. It features in some important way in every 
philosophical project. But it is not a philosopher's invention: it seems essential to our capacity to 
generalize, to reason by analogy, to form and individuate concepts and categories. If we construe 
the measure of knowledge as the similarity between the world and one's knowing representation 
of it, we have not solved the problem, since similarity is not well understood. But we will have 
reduced the problem to one that is deep and ubiquitous.
What I advocate, therefore, is not an account of the measure of knowledge, where this is 
understood as a full story of what the measure of knowledge consists in. Rather, it is a reductive 
move: the measure involved in knowing more is the measure involved in similarity. To be sure, 
many questions remain: Is similarity primitive? Or is a reduction of similarity, perhaps to 
structural identities, possible? (We know that no reduction to number of properties in common 
will be forthcoming.) e proposal also requires, at least if we are to preserve an ordinary, interest- 
and context-independent sense of knowing more and being less ignorant, that famous attacks on 
the intelligibility of objective overall similarity be defeated. Nonetheless, we can aﬃrm these as 
unsettled issues while still holding that until we have a plausible account of what similarity could 
reduce to, we have found the right place to rest.
e proposal, it should be said, is as much a retreat as an advance. Let me adapt a remark 
that Lewis makes in a closely related context. In his postscript to “Counterfactual Dependence 
and Time's Arrow”, Lewis reiterates his rejection of what he calls egalitarianism:
It is widely thought that every shared property, in the most inclusive possible sense of that 
word, is prima facie a respect of similarity: that things can be similar in respect of 
satisfying the same miscellaneously disjunctive formula, or in respect of belonging to the 
same utterly miscellaneous class. If so, then there's little to be said about comparative 
similarity. Any two things, be they two peas in a pod or be they a raven and a writing-
desk, are alike in in!nitely many respects and unlike in equally many....[But it] just isn't 
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so that all properties (in the most inclusive sense) are equally respects of similarity.  
[1986b: 53, italics his]
His rejection and what he rejects have close parallels in this paper: although one might hope that 
knowing more is a matter of accumulating a greater number of true, justi!ed beliefs, this just isn't 
so. Even if, as is doubtful, a subject's believing at a time has a cardinality, not all truths make an 
equal contribution to one's epistemic contact with the world. is is because, or is at least 
intimately tied up with the fact that, not all properties, understood in the inclusive sense as the 
semantic values of well-formed predicates in a possible language, are equally respects of similarity. 
Lewis then goes on to say:
Once we reject egalitarianism, what shall we put in its place? An analysis, somehow, of 
the diﬀerence between those properties that are respects of similarity and those that 
aren't? A primitive distinction? A distinction built into our ontology, in the form of a 
denial of the very existence of the alleged properties that aren't respects of similarity? A 
fair question; but one it is risky to take up, lest we put the onus on the wrong side. What 
we know best on this subject, I think, is that egalitarianism is prima facie incredible. We 
are entitled to reject it without owing any developed alternative. [54]
e reductive proposal oﬀered in this paper is in this spirit. What we know best on the topic of 
the measure of knowledge is that it does not consist in cardinality and that it appears to consist in 
or be similarity. Whatever that is. Sometimes it is better to have no theory than to have a bad 
theory.
e Measure of Knowledge and the Aim of Belief
e focus has been exclusively on a descriptive question in metaphysics (What is the correct 
measure on the domain of the true?). I have sought to avoid a distinct, normative question in 
epistemology (What is the good in the domain of belief?). But the descriptive issue has 
consequences for our understanding of epistemic normativity since whatever else may be 
epistemically good, knowing more and being less ignorant surely are. is is not the place to 
explore in detail the normative consequences of construing the measure of knowledge by appeal 
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to the similarity between a representation and what it represents. However, I do want to show 
how much recent discussion in epistemology of the aim of belief rests on an unstated assumption 
about the measure of knowledge, one that we have discovered in the course of this paper is false. 
And although I will not argue the point, I will suggest that construing the measure of knowledge 
by appeal to similarity preserves truth as a central aim of belief in an intuitively satisfying way.
A once-standard view of the aim of belief or inquiry is that belief or inquiry aims at 
truth. is is not a thesis about the motivations that guide individual cognizers in belief 
formation, but a claim about the constitutive or distinctly epistemic aim of belief. One set of 
challenges to this view centre on whether it can be right that truth is the only or principal thing 
of epistemic value. But a second set of challenges turn on whether it is even correct to think of 
truth in general, mere truth unquali!ed, as an aim of inquiry at all. e problem is that some 
truths seem to be not worth believing, or at least to be not much worth believing, even from an 
epistemic point of view. As Ernest Sosa aptly describes the problem:
Suppose you enter your dentist's waiting room and !nd all the magazines taken. 
Deprived of reading matter, you're sure to doze oﬀ, but you need no sleep. Are you then 
rationally bound to reach for the telephone book in pursuit of truth? Were you not to do 
so, you would forfeit a chance to pluck some desired goods within easy reach.
If random telephone numbers do not elicit a wide enough yawn, consider a 
randomly selected cubic foot of the Sahara. Here is a trove of facts, of the form grain x is 
so many millimeters in direction D from grain y, than which few can be of less interest.  
(2001, 49)
Examples abound: What is the 323rd entry in the Wichita, Kansas phone directory? (Goldman 
1999, 88) How many threads are there in my carpet or shirt? (Lynch 2004, 55)  Disjunctions 
where one disjunct is a proposition already believed, and “lots of other redundant 'garbage' of this 
sort”. (David 2005, 298) Trivial truths such as these are alleged to pose a problem for the view 
that inquiry aims at truth for a reason that is roughly captured by the following argument:
If inquiry aims at truth, it aims equally at every truth.
Inquiry does not aim equally at every truth.
Inquiry does not aim at truth.
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ere are alternative ways to develop the argument, but the core idea is that re$ection on trivial 
truths teaches us that inquiry is not egalitarian toward truths, and this teaches us that mere truth 
is not what matters. is objection has been part of a broad turn away from truth as the goal of 
inquiry, one that is rightly taken to have far-reaching consequences for our understanding of 
epistemic normativity. Does inquiry aim not at truth but at 'understanding', where this need not, 
perhaps, even be factive? Is there a constitutive connection between inquiry, even as an idealized 
activity, and the satisfaction of curiosity?  Might the diﬀerence between the trivial and the non-
trivial, or at least some of it, be understood by appeal to a contribution to human $ourishing? 
ese and a hundred other $owers bloom.
Closer attention to the measure of knowledge shows that the argument moves too 
quickly. After all, if inquiry aims at truth, it does not follow from that alone that inquiry aims 
equally at every truth, in the sense that it is indiscriminate towards truths. e attraction to 
thinking so lies in the fact that all true propositions are equally true. But the implicit assumption 
is that any two truths contribute the same amount of truth to the balance sheet. In other words, 
the objection turns on the unstated assumption that if p is one truth and q another, then one 
knows as much by knowing p as by knowing q, and one is ignorant of as much by failing to know 
p as by failing to know q. But this assumption is false for a reason that should by now be familiar: 
cardinality does not exhaust the structure of what is true.
 e trivial truths objection is correct to a point, however. Inquiry does not aim at every 
truth equally. But this is because it aims for truth, rather than grounds for thinking it doesn't. 
Imagine someone arguing:
If gold mining aimed for gold,  it would aim at every piece of gold equally – every piece 
of gold is equally gold, after all. But gold mining aims for $akes more than for dust, for 
nuggets more than for $akes, and for great veins more than anything else. So it does not 
aim for gold.
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Here the metaphysical assumption is as obvious as it is obviously false.  Gold mining is 
inegalitarian toward fragments of gold, that is true. But this does not show that gold mining does 
not aim at gold. Just the opposite: Gold mining aims for great veins because there's more gold 
there. Similarly, the reason inquiry does not aim (or aim very much) for trivial truths is because 
those truths are such that one does not increase one's knowledge, or decrease one's ignorance, 
very much by knowing them. e trivial truths objection fails, therefore, in an interesting way: 
properly understood, the fact that inquiry does not aim much for trivial truths manifests, rather 
than refutes, that inquiry aims at truth.
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